Essay 3: Politics may be reduced to a science

Is there any essential difference between one form of government and another?

May every form not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill administered?1
If all governments are alike and the only difference consists in the character and conduct of the governors the:
- most political disputes would end, and
- all zeal for one [15] constitution above another would be mere bigotry and folly.
I condemn this sentiment.
I do not think that human affairs are only due to the casual humours and characters of particular men.

The goodness of all government consists in the goodness of the administration.

We may cite many particular instances in history, where the same government, in different hands, has varied suddenly into good and bad.
Compare the French government under Henry III.2 and under Henry IV.3
Oppression, levity,° artifice° on the part of the rulers; faction,° sedition, treachery, rebellion, disloyalty on the part of the subjects:
These compose the character of Henry III’s era.
But when the patriot and heroic Henry IV succeeded and firmly seated on the throne, the government, people, and everything seemed to be totally changed.
- All this came from the difference of the temper and conduct of these two sovereigns.a
Instances of this kind may be multiplied infinitely from ancient and modern history, foreign and domestic.

But we must make a distinction.

All absolute governmentsb must very much depend on the administration
This is one of the great inconveniences attending that form of government.
But a republican and free government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular checks and controuls, provided by the constitution, had really no [16] influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public good.
Such is the intention of these forms of government, and such is their real effect, where they are wisely constituted:
As on the other hand, they are the source of all disorder, and of the blackest crimes, where either skill or honesty has been wanting in their original frame and institution.

The force of laws is so great

The particular forms of government are so many
They have so little dependence on the humours° and tempers of men.
consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us.

The Roman republic’s constitution gave the whole legislative power to the people, without allowing a negative voice either to the nobility or consuls.

This unbounded power they possessed in a collective, not in a representative body.
The consequences were:
- When the people, by success and conquest, had become very numerous, and had spread themselves to a great distance from the capital, the city-tribes, though the most contemptible, carried almost every vote:
- They were, therefore, most cajoled by every one that affected popularity:°
- They were supported in idleness by the general distribution of corn, and by particular bribes, which they received from almost every candidate:
- By this means, they became every day more licentious,°
- The Campus Martius4 was a perpetual scene of tumult and sedition:
- Armed slaves were introduced among these rascally citizens;
- so that the whole government fell into anarchy, and the greatest happiness, which the Romans could look for, was the despotic power of the Cæsars.
- Such are the effects of democracy without a representative.

A Nobility may possess the whole, or any part of the legislative power of a state, in two different ways.

Either every nobleman shares the power as part of the whole body, or the [17] whole body enjoys the power as composed of parts, which have each a distinct power and authority.
The Venetian aristocracy is an instance of the first kind of government:
The Polish of the second. In the Venetian government the whole body of nobility possesses the whole power, and no nobleman has any authority which he receives not from the whole.
In the Polish government every nobleman, by means of his fiefs,° has a distinct hereditary authority over his vassals, and the whole body has no authority but what it receives from the concurrence of its parts.
The different operations and tendencies of these two species of government might be made apparent even a priori.5
A Venetian nobility is preferable to a Polish, let the humours and education of men be ever so much varied.
A nobility, who possess their power in common, will preserve peace and order, both among themselves, and their subjects.
- No member can have authority enough to control the laws for a moment.
The nobles will preserve their authority over the people, but without any grievous tyranny, or any breach of private property; because such a tyrannical government promotes not the interests of the whole body, however it may that of some individuals.
There will be a distinction of rank between the nobility and people, but this will be the only distinction in the state.
The whole nobility will form one body, and the whole people another, without any of those private feuds and animosities, which spread ruin and desolation every where.
It is easy to see the disadvantages of a Polish nobility in every one of these particulars.

It is possible so to constitute a free government, as that a single person, call him doge,° prince, or king, shall possess a [18] large share of power, and shall form a proper balance or counterpoise to the other parts of the legislature.

This chief magistrate may be either elective or hereditary; and though the former institution may, to a superficial view, appear the most advantageous;
Yet a more accurate inspection will discover in it greater inconveniencies than in the latter, and such as are founded on causes and principles eternal and immutable.
The filling of the throne, in such a government, is a point of too great and too general interest, not to divide the whole people into factions:°
Whence a civil war, the greatest of ills, may be apprehended, almost with certainty, upon every vacancy.
The prince elected must be either a Foreigner or a Native:
The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; suspicious of his new subjects, and suspected by them; giving his confidence entirely to strangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, while their master’s favour and authority are able to support them.
A native will carry into the throne all his private animosities and friendships, and will never be viewed in his elevation,° without exciting the sentiment of envy in those, who formerly considered him as their equal.
Not to mention that a crown is too high a reward ever to be given to merit alone, and will always induce the candidates to employ force, or money, or intrigue, to procure the votes of the electors:
So that such an election will give no better chance for superior merit in the prince, than if the state had trusted to birth alone for determining their sovereign.

Here is a universal axiom in politics: A hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting by their representatives, form the best monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

But in order to prove more fully, that politics admit of general truths, which are invariable by the humour or education either of subject or sovereign, it may not be amiss to observe some other principles of this science, which may seem to deserve that character.

Free governments have been commonly the most happy for those who partake of their freedom.

Yet are they the most ruinous and oppressive to [19] their provinces.
This should be a maxim.
When a monarch extends his dominions by conquest, he soon learns to consider his old and his new subjects as on the same footing; because, in reality, all his subjects are to him the same, except the few friends and favourites, with whom he is personally acquainted.
He does not, therefore, make any distinction between them in his general laws.
- At the same time he, is careful to prevent all particular acts of oppression on the one as well as on the other.
But a free state necessarily makes a great distinction, and must always do so, until men learn to love their neighbours as well as themselves.
- The conquerors, in such a government, are all legislators.
- They will be sure to contrive matters, by restrictions on trade, and by taxes, so as to draw some private, as well as public, advantage from their conquests.
Provincial governors have also a better chance, in a republic, to escape with their plunder, by means of bribery or intrigue; and their fellow-citizens, who find their own state to be enriched by the spoils of the subject provinces, will be the more inclined to tolerate such abuses.
- It is a necessary precaution in a free state to change the governors frequently.
- This obliges these temporary tyrants to be more expeditious and rapacious, that they may accumulate sufficient wealth before they give place to their successors.
What cruel tyrants were the Romans over the world during the time of their commonwealth!
- They had laws to prevent oppression in their provincial magistrates.
- But Cicero informs us, that the Romans could not better consult the interests of the provinces than by repealing these very laws.
- For, in that case, says he, our magistrates, having entire impunity, would plunder no more than would satisfy their own rapaciousness; whereas, at present, they must also satisfy that of their judges, and of all the great men in Rome, of whose protection they stand in need.6
Who can read of the cruelties and oppressions of Verres without horror and astonishment? [20]
- And who is not touched with indignation to hear, that, after Cicero had exhausted on that abandoned criminal all the thunders of his eloquence, and had prevailed so far as to get him condemned to the utmost extent of the laws;
- yet that cruel tyrant lived peaceably to old age, in opulence and ease, and, 30 years afterwards, was put into the proscription° by Mark Anthony, on account of his exorbitant wealth, where he fell with Cicero himself, and all the most virtuous men of Rome?7
After the dissolution of the commonwealth, the Roman yoke became easier upon the provinces, as Tacitus informs us;8
- Many of the worst emperors, Domitian,9 for instance, were careful to prevent all oppression on the provinces.
- In10 Tiberius’s time, Gaul was esteemed richer than Italy itself:
- Nor, do I find, during the whole time of the Roman monarchy, that the empire became less rich or populous in any of its provinces; though indeed its valour and military discipline were always upon the [21] decline.
The oppression and tyranny of the Carthaginians over their subject states in Africa went so far, as we learn from Polybius,11 that, not content with exacting the half of all the produce of the land, which of itself was a very high rent, they also loaded them with many other taxes.d
If we pass from ancient to modern times, we shall still find the observation to hold.
- The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than those of free states.
- Compare the Païs conquis° of France with Ireland, and you will be convinced of this truth;
- though this latter kingdom, being, in a good measure, peopled from England, possesses so many rights and privileges as should naturally make it challenge better treatment than that of a conquered province.
- Corsica is also an obvious instance to the same purpose.12

I think that Machiavelli’s observations of Alexander the Great’s conquests are one of those eternal political truths.

It seems strange that:
- such sudden conquests, as those of Alexander, should be possessed so peaceably by his successors.
- the Persians, during all the confusions and civil wars among the Greeks, never made the smallest effort towards recovering their former independent government.13
To answer this, we must [22] consider that a monarch may govern his subjects in two different ways:
- He may either follow the maxims of the eastern princes and stretch his authority so far as to leave:
  - no distinction of rank among his subjects, but what proceeds immediately from himself;
  - no advantages of birth;
  - no hereditary honours and possessions
  - no credit among the people, except from his commission alone.
- He may exert his power after a milder manner, like other European princes.
  - He may leave other sources of honour
    - his smile and favour
    - Birth
    - titles
    - possessions
    - valour
    - integrity
    - knowledge
    - great and fortunate atchievements.
In the first manner, after a conquest, it is impossible ever to shake off the yoke; since no one possesses, among the people, so much personal credit and authority as to begin such an enterprize:
In the latter, the least misfortune, or discord among the victors, will encourage the vanquished to take arms, who have leaders ready to prompt and conduct them in every undertaking.14

[23]

Such is the reasoning of Machiavel, which seems solid and conclusive.

But I wish he had not mixed falsehood with truth in asserting that:
- Eastern monarchies are more easily kept once subdued but are the most difficult to subdue since they cannot contain any powerful subject, whose discontent and faction may facilitate the enemy’s efforts.
A tyrannical government weakens the courage of men and renders them indifferent towards the fortunes of their sovereign.
- Even the temporary and delegated authority of its generals and [24] magistrates are as absolute as that of the prince himself.
  - This can produce the most dangerous and fatal revolutions
  - This happens with barbarians who are accustomed to a blind submission.
Therefore, in every respect, a gentle government is preferable, and gives the greatest security to the sovereign and to the subject.

Legislators, therefore, should not trust the future government of a state entirely to chance.

Instead, it should provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of public affairs to the latest posterity.
Effects will always correspond to causes
Wise regulations in any commonwealth are the most valuable legacy that can be left to future ages.
In the smallest court or office, the stated forms and methods, by which business must be conducted, are found to be a considerable check on the natural depravity of mankind.
Why should not the case be the same in public affairs?
Can we ascribe the stability and wisdom of the Venetian government, through so many ages, to any thing but the form of government?
Is it not easy to point out those defects in the original constitution, which produced the tumultuous governments of Athens and Rome, and ended in their ruin?
- So little dependance has this affair on the humours and education of particular men.
  - One part of the same republic may be wisely conducted, and another weakly, by the very same men, merely on account of the difference of the forms and institutions, by which these parts are regulated.
This was actually the case with Genoa.
- The state was always full of sedition, tumult, and disorder.
- But the bank of St. George, which had become a considerable part of the people, was conducted, for several ages, with the utmost integrity and wisdom.15

[25]

The ages of greatest public spirit are not always most eminent for private virtue.

Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity or justice into the tempers of men.
The most illustrious period of the Roman history, considered in a political view, is that between the beginning of the first and end of the last Punic war.
- The due balance between the nobility and the people were then fixed by the contests of the tribunes.
  - It was not yet lost by the extent of conquests.
Yet at this very time, the horrid practice of poisoning was so common.
- A Prætor was punished capitally for this crime above 3,000 16 persons in a part of Italy.
- They found information of this nature still multiplying upon him.
There is [26] a worse instance,17 in the more early times of the commonwealth.
- So depraved in private life were that people, whom in their histories we so much admire.
- They were really more virtuous during the time of the two Triumvirates when they were:
  - tearing their common country to pieces, and
  - spreading slaughter and desolation over the face of the earth, merely for the choice of tyrants.18,f

Here is enough inducement to maintain in every free state, with the utmost Zeal, those institutions where:

liberty is secured
the public good consulted
the avarice or ambition of particular men restrained and punished.

It does most honour to human nature to see it susceptible of so noble a passion.

The greatest indication of meanness° of heart in any man, is to see him destitute of it.
A man who loves only himself, without regard to friendship and desert,° merits the severest blame; [27]
A man, who is only susceptible of friendship, without public spirit, or a regard to the community, is deficient in the most material part of virtue.

But this is a subject which needs not be longer insisted on at present.

There are now° of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions of their partizans, and under pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of their particular faction.
I am always more fond of promoting moderation than zeal.
- But the surest way of producing moderation in every party is to increase our zeal for the public.
Let us therefore draw a lesson of moderation with regard to the parties, into which our country is at presentg divided
At the same time, that we allow not this moderation to abate the industry and passion, with which every individual is bound to pursue the good of his country.19

Our government allows the utmost liberty.

Those who attack or defend a minister in such a government as ours,20 always:
- carry matters to an extreme
- exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public.
His enemies are sure to charge him with the greatest enormities, both in domestic and [28] foreign management.
- There is no meanness or crime, of which, in their account, he is not capable.
- Unnecessary wars, scandalous treaties, profusion of public treasure, oppressive taxes, every kind of mal-administration is ascribed to him.
It is said that to aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, will extend its baleful influence even to posterity, by:
- undermining the best constitution in the world, and
- disordering that wise system of laws, institutions, and customs which happily governed our ancestors
He is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has removed every security provided against wicked ministers for the future.

On the other hand, the partizans of the minister make his panegyric° run as high as the accusation against him, and celebrate his wise, steady, and moderate conduct in every part of his administration.

The honour and interest of the nation supported abroad, public credit maintained at home, persecution restrained, faction subdued; the merit of all these blessings is ascribed solely to the minister.
At the same time, he crowns all his other merits by a religious° care of the best constitution in the world, which he has preserved in all its parts, and has transmitted entire, to be the happiness and security of the latest posterity.

When this accusation and panegyric are received by the partizans of each party, they:

beget an extraordinary ferment on both sides, and
fill the nation with violent animosities.

But I would persuade these party-zealots, that there is a plain contradiction both in the accusation and panegyric.

This contradiction makes it impossible for either of them to run so high.
Our constitution is:
- the pride of Britain
- the envy of our neighbours
- raised by the labour of so many centuries
- repaired at the expence of so many millions
- cemented by such a profusion of blood;21
- a noble fabric.
If our constitution are really [29] these eulogies,h it would never have allowed a wicked and weak minister to govern triumphantly for 20 years who was opposed by the nation’s greatest geniuses.
- Those geniuses exercised the utmost liberty of tongue and pen:
  - in parliament, and
  - in their frequent appeals to the people.
- If the minister is wicked and weak, the constitution must be faulty in its original principles.
  - He cannot consistently be charged with undermining the best form of government in the world.
A constitution is only good if it provides a remedy against mal-administration;
- If the British constitution in its greatest vigour was repaired by two such remarkable events, as the Revolution and Accession, by which our ancient royal family was sacrificed to it;22
- If our constitution with so great advantages, [30] does not provide any such remedy, then we are beholden to any minister who undermines it.
  - We should then create a better constitution in its place.

I would employ the same topics to moderate the zeal of those who defend the minister.

Is our constitution so excellent?
- Then a change of ministry can be no such dreadful event since it is essential to such a constitution, in every ministry, both to:
  - preserve itself from violation, and
  - prevent all enormities in the administration.
Is our constitution very bad?
- Then so extraordinary a jealousy and apprehension, on account of changes, is ill placed.
- A man should be as anxious in this case as a husband, who had married a woman from the stews,° should be watchful to prevent her infidelity.
- Public affairs, in such a government, must necessarily go to confusion, by whatever hands they are conducted.
- The zeal of patriots is in that case much less requisite than the patience and submission of philosophers.
The virtue and good intentions of Cato and Brutus are highly laudable.
- But, to what purpose did their zeal serve?23
- Only to :
  - hasten the fatal period of the Roman government, and
  - render its convulsions and dying agonies more violent and painful.

I do not mean that public affairs deserve no care and attention at all.

If men were moderate and consistent, their claims might be admitted; at least examined.
The country-party might still assert, that our constitution, though excellent, will admit of maladministration to a certain degree.
- Therefore, if the minister is bad, it is proper to oppose him with a suitable degree of zeal.
On the other hand, the court-party may be allowed, upon the [31] supposition that the minister were good, to defend, and with some zeal too, his administration.
I would only persuade men not to contend, as if they were fighting pro aris & focis,° and change a good constitution into a bad one, by the violence of their factions.i

I have not here considered any thing that is personal in the present controversy.

In the best civil constitution, every man is restrained by the most rigid laws.
It is easy:
- to discover either the minister’s intentions.
- to judge, whether his personal character deserves love or hatred.
But such questions are not important to the public.
- These questions lay those, who employ their pens upon them, under a just suspicion either of malevolence or of flattery.

Share this: