This excess of taxes* created the prodigious facility with which the Muslims carried on their conquests.
- Instead of a continual series of extortions, devised by the subtle avarice of the Greek emperors, the people were subjected to a simple tribute which was paid and collected with ease.
- Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous nation than a corrupt government, in which they suffered every inconvenience of lost liberty with all the horror of present slavery.
Chapter 17: The Augmentation of Troops
A NEW distemper has spread itself over Europe.
- It has infecting our princes, inducing them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops.
- It has its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious.
- For, as soon as one prince augments his forces, the rest of course do the same; so that nothing is gained thereby but the public ruin.
- Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot as if his people were in danger of being exterminated;
- They give the name of peace* to this general effort of all against all.
- Thus is Europe ruined to such a degree, that, were private people to be in the same situation as the three most opulent powers of this part of the globe, they would not have necessary subsistance.
- We are poor with the riches and commerce of the whole world; and soon, by thus augmenting our troops, we shall be all soldiers, and be reduced to the very same situation as the Tartars‡.
Great princes are not satisfied with hiring or buying troops of petty states.
- They make it their business on all sides to pay subsidies for alliances, that is, generally to throw away their money.
The consequence of such a situation is the perpetual augmentation of taxes.
- The mischief, which prevents all future remedy, is, that they reckon no more upon their revenues, but in waging war against their whole capital.
- It is not unusual to see governments mortgage their funds even in time of peace, and to employ what they call extraordinary means to ruin themselves; means so extraordinary indeed, that such are hardly thought on by the most extravagant young spendthrift.
Chapter 18: An Exemption from Taxes
THE maxim of the great eastern empires of exempting such provinces, as have very much suffered, from taxes, ought to be extended to monarchical states.
- There are some indeed where this practice is established; yet the country is more [289] oppressed than if no such rule took place; because, as the prince levies still neither more nor less, the state becomes bound for the whole. In order to ease a village that pays badly, they load another that pays better; the former is not relieved, and the latter is ruined.
- The people grow desperate between the necessity of paying, for fear of exactions, and the danger of paying, for fear of new burdens.
A well-regulated government ought to set aside, for the first article of its expence, a determinate sum to answer contingent cases.
- It is with the public as with individuals, who are ruined when they live up exactly to their income.
With regard to an obligation for the whole, amongst the inhabitants of the same village, some pretend*, that it is but reasonable, because there is a possibility of a fraudulent combination on their side: but was it ever heard that upon mere supposition we are to establish a thing in itself unjust and ruinous to the state?
Chapter 19: Is it better to do tax farming or direct tax collection?
THE managing of the revenues by commission is like the conduct of a good father of a family, who collects his own rents himself with œconomy and order.
- This allows the prince to press or retard the levy of the taxes, either according to his own wants or to [290] those of his people.
- He saves to the state the immense profits of the farmers, who impoverish it a thousand ways.
- He prevents the people from being mortified with the sight of sudden fortunes.
- By this the public money passes through few hands, goes directly to the treasury, and consequently makes a quicker return to the people.
- By this the prince avoids an infinite number of bad laws, extorted from him by the importunate avarice of the farmers, who pretend to offer a present advantage for regulations pernicious to posterity.
The moneyed man is always the most powerful.
- So the tax farmer renders himself arbitrary even over the prince himself.
- He is not the legislator, but he obliges the legislator to give laws.
Sometimes, it is useful to farm out a new duty.
- For there is an art in preventing frauds which motives of interest suggest to the farmers, but commissioners never think on.
- How the tax will be levied after it has been established by the farmer may later be safely entrusted to a commission.
- In England, the management of the excise and of the post-office was borrowed from that of the farmers of the revenue.
In republics, the revenues of the state are generally managed by commission.
- The contrary practice was a great defect in the Roman government†.
- In despotic governments, the people are infinitely happier where this management is established, such as Persia and China‡.
- The unhappiest of all are those where the prince farms out his sea-ports and trading cities.
- The history of monarchies abounds with mischiefs done by the farmers of the revenue.
Nero got angry at the oppressive extortions of the publicans.
- So he formed a magnanimous but impracticable scheme of abolishing all imposts.
- He did not think of managing the revenues by commissioners.
- Instead, he made four edicts:
- The laws, enacted against publicans, which had hitherto been kept secret, should be promulged.
- that they should exact no claims for above a year backward;
- that there should be a prætor established to determine their pretensions without any formality; and
- that the merchants should pay no duty for their vessels. These were the halcyon days of that emperor.
Chapter 20: The Tax Farmers
The state is ruined when the lucrative profession of a tax farmer becomes a post of honour.
- It might be good enough in despotic governments, where this employment is often exercised by the governors themselves.
- But it is improper in a republic, since a custom of the like nature destroyed that of Rome.
- It is also improper in monarchies; nothing being more opposite to the spirit of this government.
- All the other orders of the state are dissatisfied;
- honour loses its whole value;
- the gradual and natural means of distinction are no longer respected; and
- the very principle of the government is subverted.
Scandalous fortunes were raised in the past.
- But this was one of the calamities of the fifty years war.
- These riches were then considered as ridiculous; now we admire them.
Every profession has its particular lot: that of the tax-gatherers is wealth; and wealth is its own reward.
- Glory and honour fall to the share of that nobility who are sensible of no other happiness.
- Respect and esteem are for those ministers and magistrates whose whole life is a continued series of labour, and who watch day and night over the welfare of the empire.
Metascience 